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Abstract
Known secure multi-party computation protocols are quite complex, involving non-trivial mathematical structures and sub-
protocols. The purpose of this paper is to present a very simple approach to secure multi-party computation with straight-forward
security proofs. This approach naturally yields protocols secure for mixed (active and passive) corruption and general (as opposed
to threshold) adversary structures, conﬁrming the previously proved tight bounds in a simpler framework. Due to their simplicity,
the described protocols are well-suited for didactic purposes, which is a main goal of this paper.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We propose a new, very simple approach to multi-party computation (MPC) secure against active cheating and, more
generally, mixed corruption scenarios. This work is motivated by a protocol of Beaver and Wool [2] which achieves
security only for a passive adversary setting, without the possibility to enhance it to active adversary settings.
In this section we review the deﬁnition of secure MPC, discuss various models for specifying the adversary’s
capabilities, and review different types of security and communication models. A reader familiar with these topics can
skip Section 1 and much of Section 4, where previous results are reviewed. After discussing secret-sharing and other
preliminaries in Section 2, our model and results are stated in Section 3. Themain parts of the paper are Section 5, where
the passively secure protocol and the underlying secret-sharing scheme is presented, and Section 6 which presents the
protocol secure in the general corruption model.
1.1. Secure multi-party computation
Secure function evaluation, as introduced by Yao [23], allows a set P = {p1, . . . , pn} of n players to compute an
arbitrary agreed function of their private inputs x1, . . . , xn, respectively, even if an adversary may corrupt and control
some of the players in variousways, to be discussed below.More generally, secureMPC allows the players to perform an
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arbitrary on-going computation during which new inputs can be provided and players can interact with an environment.
This corresponds to the simulation of a trusted party [14,15].
Security in MPC means that the players’ inputs remain secret (except for what is revealed by the intended results
of the computation) and that the results of the computation are guaranteed to be correct. More precisely, security is
deﬁned relative to an ideal-world speciﬁcation involving a trusted party: anything the adversary can achieve in the real
world (where the protocol is executed) he can also achieve in the ideal world [5,21].
Many distributed cryptographic protocols can be seen as special cases of secureMPC. For speciﬁc tasks like collective
contract signing, on-line auctions, or voting, there exist very efﬁcient protocols. Throughout this paper we consider
general secure MPC protocols, where general means that any given speciﬁcation involving a trusted party can be
computed securely without the trusted party. In other words, we consider compilers that take as input a speciﬁcation
and generate a secure protocol for realizing the speciﬁcation.
Most protocols for general secure MPC work roughly as follows: The function (or speciﬁcation) to be computed is
speciﬁed by a circuit over some ﬁnite ﬁeld consisting of addition andmultiplication gates. This is no essential restriction.
Each input value and each intermediate result is shared appropriately among the players so that no cheating player set
can learn anything. The circuit is evaluated gate by gate, performing a sub-protocol for each gate. The result(s) of the
computation are jointly reconstructed.
General MPC protocols tend to be less efﬁcient than special-purpose protocols, for two reasons. First, the circuit can
generally be quite large. Second, the multiplication sub-protocol is rather inefﬁcient as it requires substantial interaction
(but see [17] for efﬁciency improvements for general MPC protocols).
1.2. Specifying the adversary’s capabilities
The potential misbehavior of some of the players is usually modeled by considering a central adversary with an
overall cheating strategy who can corrupt some of the players. Two different notions of corruption, passive and active
corruption, are usually considered. Passive corruption means that the adversary learns the entire internal information
of the corrupted player, but the player continues to perform the protocol correctly. Such players are sometimes also
called semi-honest. Active corruption means that the adversary can take full control of the corrupted player and can
make him deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. If no active corruptions are considered, then the only security issue is
the secrecy of the players’ inputs.
A non-adaptive or static adversary must decide before the execution of the protocol which players he corrupts, while
an adaptive adversary can corrupt new players during the protocol, as long as the total set of corrupted players is still
admissible. A mobile adversary can release some of the corrupted players, thereby regaining corruption power. We
consider adaptive, but not mobile adversaries.
In many papers, the adversary’s corruption capability is speciﬁed by a threshold t, i.e., the adversary is assumed to be
able to corrupt up to t (but not more) players. More generally, the adversary’s corruption capability could be speciﬁed
by a so-called adversary structure, i.e., a set of potentially corruptible subsets of players. Even more generally, the
corruption capability can be speciﬁed by a set of corruption scenarios, one of which the adversary can choose (secretly).
For instance, each scenario can specify a set of players that can be passively corrupted and a subset of them that can
even be actively corrupted. In Section 4 we describe these models and the results known for them.
1.3. Types of security and communication models
One distinguishes between two types of security. Information-theoretic security means that even an adversary with
unrestricted computing power cannot cheat or violate secrecy, while cryptographic security relies on an assumed
restriction on the adversary’s computing power and on certain unproven assumptions about the hardness of some
computational problem, like factoring large integers. The terms “perfect” and “unconditional” security are often used
for information-theoretic security with zero and negligible error probability, respectively. In this paper we consider
perfect information-theoretic security, i.e., the probability of successful cheating is zero and the information leaked to
the adversary is also zero.
Several communication models are considered in the literature. In the standard synchronous model (for information-
theoretic security), any pair of players can communicate over a bilateral secure channel. Some papers [22,1,7] assume
the availability of a broadcast channel which guarantees the consistency of the received values if a sender sends a
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value to several players, but in practice a broadcast channel must be simulated by a (quite inefﬁcient) protocol among
the players (e.g. [19,4,10]). In asynchronous communication models, no guarantees about the arrival times of sent
messages are assumed. Here we do not consider asynchronous communication models, although our techniques may
also be applied in that context.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Structures
Deﬁnition 1. Consider a ﬁnite set P . We call a subset  of the power set 2P of P a (monotone) structure for P if 
is closed under taking subsets, i.e., if S ∈  and S′ ⊆ S imply S′ ∈ . We deﬁne a (commutative and associative)
operation on structures, denoted unionsq : 1 unionsq 2 is the structure consisting of all unions of one element of 1 and one
element of 2, i.e.,
1 unionsq2 := {S1 ∪ S2 : S1 ∈ 1, S2 ∈ 2}.
Structures will be described by listing only the maximal sets, their subsets being understood as belonging to the
structure. The size || of a structure  is the number of maximal elements.
Example 1. The most common example of a structure is the threshold structure = {S : S ⊆ P, |S| t} for some t.
Note that the description that lists the maximal sets has size
(
n
t
)
which is exponential in n if t is a ﬁxed fraction of n.
2.2. Secret-sharing and secrecy structures
A secret-sharing scheme allows a dealer to share a value among a set P = {p1, . . . , pn} of players such that only
certain qualiﬁed subsets of players can reconstruct the secret, i.e., are qualiﬁed, while certain other subsets of players
obtain no information about the secret, i.e., are ignorant (a term not used in the previous literature). Natural secret-
sharing schemes (and also those of this paper) have the property that every subset of P is either qualiﬁed or ignorant,
and this is why ignorant sets are usually called non-qualiﬁed. However, for reasons explained below, we choose the
new terminology.
The secrecy condition is actually stronger: even if any ignorant player set holds any kind of partial information about
the shared value, they must not obtain any additional information about the shared value. Stated differently, what an
ignorant set receives is statistically independent of the information they hold and the shared value. Equivalently, such
an ignorant set can simulate their shares with the same probability distribution as that occurring in the actual protocol.
A secret-sharing scheme is usually speciﬁed by the so-called access structure2 , the collection of qualiﬁed player
subsets. In our context, it is more natural to characterize a secret-sharing scheme by the secrecy structure  consisting
of the collection of ignorant player subsets. As mentioned above, the secrecy structure is typically the complement of
the access structure, i.e., = 2P \.
Why is it more natural to consider the secrecy structure instead of the access structure, and why is the term ignorant
more natural than non-qualiﬁed? When the potential misbehavior of players is considered, one leaves the realm of
classical secret-sharing. For instance, players could misbehave by not sending their share when supposed to, or by
even sending a false share. In such a case, a qualiﬁed set can generally not reconstruct the secret, i.e, the notion of
being qualiﬁed loses its normal meaning. In contrast, the notion of secrecy is not changed by misbehaving players. If a
secret is shared according to a certain scheme, then the secrecy structure remains unchanged, even if players misbehave
(except, of course, restricting the secrecy structure to sets containing the corrupted players).
2 But note that, according to our terminology, it is actually an anti-structure, where we call  a (monotone) anti-structure if it is closed under
taking supersets, i.e., if the complement c := {S ∈ 2P : S /∈} is a structure.
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2.3. Adversary structures and security against active cheating
Asmentioned earlier, as a generalization of specifying the adversary’s capabilities by a corruption type and a threshold
t, one can describe it by a corruption type and an adversary structure  meaning that the adversary can choose one of
the sets in  and corrupt these players [15]. For passive corruption we can also call this structure the secrecy structure
rather than the adversary structure.
When players can cheat actively, then even the consistency of the value sent by a player to several other players is
not guaranteed. In other words, one must use a so-called broadcast protocol (e.g. [19,4,10]) to assure that all honest
players receive the same value, and that if the sender is honest, then the received value is that actually sent by the
sender. A classical result [19] in the theory of distributed systems is that such a protocol exists if and only if less than
a third of the players cheat.
More generally, a cheating dealer in a secret-sharing scheme could distribute inconsistent shares, resulting in a
situation where no value can be reconstructed. The consistency of the shared values must again be guaranteed by a
special protocol, called veriﬁable secret-sharing (VSS).
3. Models and results of this paper
We present a very simple approach to secure multi-party computation. Unlike previous approaches, it is based on
essentially no mathematical structure (like bivariate polynomials or zero-knowledge proofs), and it naturally yields
protocols secure against general mixed adversary structures.
The main focus of the paper is on simplicity of the protocols, which makes them suitable for didactic purposes.
However, it is quite possible that the protocol ideas have applications in other contexts and that for certain applications,
especially when involving only a small number of players, the protocols are the most efﬁcient known.
The adversary is speciﬁed by a secrecy structure  and an adversary structure  ⊆ , with the following meaning.
Deﬁnition 2. Consider a player set P and two structures  ⊆ 2P and  ⊆ . A (,)-adversary is an adversary who
can (adaptively) corrupt some players passively and some players actively, as long as the set A of actively corrupted
players and the set B of passively corrupted players satisfy both
A ∈  and (A ∪ B) ∈ .
In other words, a cheating player set A cannot violate the correctness, and all corrupted players together (the set
A∪B) obtain no information not speciﬁed by the protocol. This model is the same as that of [9] where only veriﬁable
secret-sharing is considered.
The following theorems give increasingly strong conditions for broadcast, for veriﬁable secret-sharing, and for secure
MPC to be possible. The efﬁciency of the protocols is polynomial in n, ||, and ||, but this fact is not stated explicitly.
Theorem 1. The simulation of a broadcast channel secure against a (,)-adversary is possible if and only if P /∈unionsq
 unionsq .
Theorem 2. Perfect veriﬁable secret-sharing secure against a (,)-adversary is possible if and only ifP /∈unionsqunionsq.
Theorem 3. General perfect information-theoretically secure MPC secure against a (,)-adversary is possible if
and only if P /∈ unionsq  unionsq .
Theorem 1 follows from a more general result in [15] and the efﬁcient broadcast protocol given in [13]. This theorem
is used, but not considered further in this paper. Theorem 3 is equivalent to Theorem 1 of [12], as will be explained in
Section 4.4.
As stated in these theorems, all these results are known to be tight in the sense that larger adversary structures
cannot be tolerated. We do not discuss such impossibility proofs here. They work by proving the impossibility for a
small player set (n = 2 or 3) and showing that any protocol violating the stated bounds could be transformed into an
impossible protocol for a small player set. For example, broadcast among three players with one cheater can be proved
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to be impossible. This implies the necessity of the P /∈ unionsq  unionsq  condition. Similarly, the secure computation of the
OR function of two input bits held by two players (n= 2) is impossible, even if both players are only passive cheaters.
This implies the necessity of the condition P /∈ unionsq .
4. Review of results on general secure multi-party computation
In this section we review the previous results on necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for general secure MPC to be
possible, for various models and degrees of generality.
4.1. Classical threshold results
In the original papers solving the general secure MPC problem, the adversary is speciﬁed by a single corruption type
(active or passive) and a threshold t on the tolerated number of corrupted players. Goldreich,Micali, andWigderson [14]
proved that, based on cryptographic intractability assumptions, general secure MPC is possible if and only if t < n/2
players are actively corrupted. The threshold for passive corruption is t < n. In the information-theoretic model, where
bilateral secure channels between every pair of players are assumed, Ben-Or, Goldwasser, andWigderson [3] proved that
perfect security is possible if and only if t < n/3 for active corruption, and if and only if t < n/2 for passive corruption.3
In a model with a physical broadcast channel, which helps only in case of active corruption, unconditional security is
achievable if and only if t < n/2 [22,1,7]. These classical results are summarized in Table 1.
4.2. Mixed adversary models
The exact threshold conditions for mixed models under which secure MPC is possible were proved in [11], including
fail-corruption as a third corruption type. Here we state the results without considering fail-corruption. Let ta and tp be
the number of players that can be actively and passively corrupted, respectively. Perfect security is achievable if and
only if 3ta + 2tp <n, whether or not a broadcast channel is available. This is a special case of Theorem 3.4
4.3. General adversary structures
The threshold adversary models were extended to a non-threshold setting in [15] (see also [16]), for either passive or
active, but not for mixed corruption. The adversary’s capability is characterized by a structure, called secrecy structure
 for passive corruption and adversary structure  for active corruption. Again, generalizing the model leads to strictly
stronger results compared to those achievable in the threshold model. For instance, in the case of 6 players and active
corruption, with P ={A,B,C,D,E, F }, one can obtain a protocol secure against the structure with ={{A}, {B,D},
{B,E, F }, {C,E}, {C,F }, {D,E,F }}, whereas in the threshold model one can tolerate only a single active cheater,
i.e., the adversary structure = {{A}, {B}, {C}, {D}, {E}, {F }}.
Table 1
Necessary and sufﬁcient threshold conditions for general secure MPC to be possible
Setting Adversary type Condition Reference
Cryptographic Passive t < n [14]
Cryptographic Active t < n/2 [14]
Information-theoretic Passive t < n/2 [3,6]
Information-theoretic Active t < n/3 [3,6]
i.t., with broadcast Active t < n/2 [22,1]
3 The same result was obtained independently by Chaum et al. [6], but with an exponentially small error probability.
4 Exponentially small error probability with a broadcast channel is achievable if and only if 2ta + 2tp <n. Without broadcast, the additional
condition 3ta < n is necessary and sufﬁcient. This strictly improves on non-mixed threshold results: In addition to tolerating ta < n/3 actively
corrupted players, secrecy can be guaranteed against every minority, thus tolerating additional tpn/6 passively corrupted players.
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Let Q2() be the condition on a structure  that no two sets in  cover the full player set P , i.e.,
Q2() ⇐⇒ P /∈ unionsq.
Similarly, let Q3() be the condition that no three sets in  cover the full player set P , i.e.,
Q3() ⇐⇒ P /∈ unionsq unionsq.
The main results of [15] state that for passive corruption, Q2() is the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for general
secure MPC to be possible. For active corruption, the condition is Q3(), and if a broadcast channel is available,
then the condition is Q2(). The ﬁrst two results are again special cases of Theorem 3. These results were achieved
by a recursive player substitution technique, yielding quite complex (but polynomial in the size of ) protocols. The
protocols of this paper are much simpler, more intuitive, and considerably more efﬁcient.
4.4. Mixed general adversary structures
Finally, general mixed adversary speciﬁcations were considered in [12] and the exact conditions for general secure
MPC to be possible were given for a general mixed passive/active model. For each admissible choice, the adversary
can actively corrupt a subset D ⊆ P of the players, and, additionally, can passively corrupt another subset E ⊆ P of
the players. The adversary speciﬁcation  is hence a set of pairs (D,E), i.e.,
= {(D1, E1), . . . , (Dk,Ek)},
for some k, and the adversary may select one arbitrary pair (Di, Ei) from  and corrupt the players in Di actively
and, additionally, corrupt the players in Ei passively. The adversary’s choice is not known before and typically also not
after execution of the protocol. It was proved in [12] that, with or without broadcast channels, perfect general MPC is
achievable if and only if the adversary speciﬁcation  satisﬁes the following condition Q(3,2)():
Q(3,2)() ⇔ ∀(D1, E1), (D2, E2), (D3, E3) ∈  : D1 ∪ E1 ∪ D2 ∪ E2 ∪ D3 
= P .
At ﬁrst sight, these results look more general than Theorem 3 since the adversary speciﬁcation consists of a general
set of pairs rather than two structures. However, they are equivalent, which can be seen as follows. For an adversary
speciﬁcation = {(D1, E1), . . . , (Dk,Ek)} we can deﬁne naturally an associated secrecy structure
() = {D ∪ E : (D,E) ∈ }
and an associated adversary structure
() = {D : (D,E) ∈  for some E}.
Now we can deﬁne the closure  of  as
 := {(D,E) : D ∈ () ∧ (D ∪ E) ∈ ()}.
It is not difﬁcult to show that Q(3,2)() ⇔ Q(3,2)(). Therefore secure MPC is possible for a given adversary
speciﬁcation  if and only if it is possible for . In other words, one can enlarge any speciﬁcation  to its closure 
for free.5 This justiﬁes the consideration of (,)-adversaries as discussed above. To see this, take any (Di, Ei) and
(Dj ,Ej ), add the new pair (Di, (Dj ∪ Ej)\Di) to , and check that the condition Q(3,2)() is still satisﬁed.
5 However, there may exist protocols secure for  but not for . But in such a case there would exist a different protocol secure for , with
possibly (much) higher complexity.
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5. Secure MPC: The passive case
5.1. The format of the protocol
The computation to be performed is speciﬁed by a circuit over some ﬁnite ﬁeld consisting of addition and multipli-
cation gates, whose inputs are the players inputs into the computation.6 Each input value and each intermediate result
is shared among the players, according to the secrecy structure, using a linear secret-sharing scheme.
Due to the linearity, secure addition and more generally computing any linear function of shared values is trivial:
every player locally computes the linear function of his shares and keeps the result as a share of the new value. Secrecy
is trivially guaranteed because this step involves no communication. Correctness is also trivially guaranteed because
due to the lack of communication there is no chance for a corrupted player to cheat. Hence the only remaining problem
is the secure multiplication of shared values.
5.2. The secret-sharing scheme
As a building block, we need a k-out-of-k secret-sharing scheme, i.e., one for k players such that only the complete
set of players (but no proper subset) can reconstruct the secret. Such a scheme (actually linear) for any k and any domain
D of the secret s is obtained by splitting s into a random sum.7
k-out-of-k secret-sharing:
Select k − 1 shares s1, . . . , sk−1 at random from D and let sk : =s −∑k−1i=1 si .
The ith share is si .
Lemma 1. The above scheme is a k-out-of-k secret-sharing scheme.
Proof. All shares together obviously determine the secret, hence the set of all k players is qualiﬁed. Any set of k − 1
players (with, say, pi missing) is ignorant because these k − 1 shares (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sk) are independent and
uniformly random, independently of s. This follows from the fact that for any ﬁxed s and any ﬁxed (missing) share si , the
mapping from (s1, . . . , sk−1) to (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sk) is one-to-one. The shares can be simulated by generating
a set of uniform and independent shares. 
The most natural approach to designing a secret-sharing scheme for a given access structure  (or the secrecy
structure =2P \) is due to Itoh et al. [18] who introduced general access structures in secret-sharing. In this scheme,
the secret is shared, independently, to each minimal qualiﬁed player set S ∈ , with an |S|-out-of-|S| secret-sharing
scheme. This trivially guarantees that any qualiﬁed set can reconstruct the secret and that no ignorant set S /∈ gets
any information about the secret.
In this paper we use a different, in a sense dual approach. Let k be the number of maximal sets in , i.e.  =
{T1, . . . , Tk},8 and let Ti := P \Ti be the complement of the set Ti .
Secret-sharing for secrecy structure = {T1, . . . , Tk}:
1. Split the secret using the k-out-of-k secret-sharing scheme, resulting in shares s1, . . . , sk .
2. Send si (secretly) to each player in Ti .
(The share of player pm is hence the set {si : m ∈ Ti}.)
Lemma 2. The above scheme is a secret-sharing scheme for secrecy structure = {T1, . . . , Tk}.
6 More generally, the circuit could contain any gates for linear functions, plus (non-linear) multiplication gates.
7 It is trivial to impose an addition operation on D which makes it into an additive group, for instance the group isomorphic to the cyclic group
Z|D|.
8 Recall that a structure is speciﬁed by the maximal sets.
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Proof. The scheme is trivially -secure because for any set T ∈ , at least one share (namely that given to the
complement of a maximal set of  containing T) is missing. Hence, according to Lemma 1, the set T has no information
about the secret. Moreover, for any ignorant set S, the obtained information consists of some (but not all) shares si and
k-out-of-k sharings thereof. This information is independent of anything else and could actually be simulated by S.
Reconstruction by any qualiﬁed set in = 2P \ is simple. Any set S ∈  contains, for every maximal set Ti ∈ , a
player not in Ti . This player knows si , and hence the players in S know all the shares si and are thus qualiﬁed. 
5.3. The multiplication protocol
As mentioned earlier, the condition Q2(), which is equivalent to
P /∈ unionsq , (1)
is necessary and sufﬁcient for information-theoretically secure MPC for passive corruption. Condition (1) means that
for any two maximal sets T1, T2 ∈ we have T1 ∪T2 
= P , which is equivalent to the condition that for any T1, T2 ∈ ,
their complements intersect, i.e., (P \T1) ∩ (P \T2) 
= {}. A set of sets, no two of which are disjoint, is also called a
quorum system. Condition (1) is thus equivalent to the statement that the sets P \Ti for i = 1, . . . , k form a quorum
system.
The product of two shared values s and t can be computed as
st =
(
k∑
i=1
si
)
·
⎛
⎝ k∑
j=1
tj
⎞
⎠= k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
si tj , (2)
i.e., as the sum of k2 share products. Therefore we can use the following observation by Beaver and Wool [2], used
originally for a different secret-sharing scheme (see Section 5.4). For every term si tj in the above sum, there exists
at least one player who knows both si and tj . This player (or one of them) can compute the product si tj and share it
among the players (using the basic secret-sharing scheme). Since st is a linear combination of these shared values si tj ,
the sharing of st can be computed non-interactively. An efﬁciency improvement is obtained if each player ﬁrst adds
all terms assigned to him and then shares the sum. Note that terms of the form si ti (i.e., i = j ) can be assigned to any
player knowing the ith share. In summary, we have:
Multiplication protocol (passive):
Preparation (once and for all): Partition the set {(i, j) : 1 i, jn} into n sets U1, . . . , Un such that for all
(i, j) ∈ Um we have m ∈ Ti ∩ Tj . 9
Precondition: Two values s =∑ki=1 si and t =∑ki=1 ti are shared.
Postcondition: st is shared independently.
1. Each player pm (for 1mn) computes vm :=∑(i,j)∈Um si tj and shares vm among all players (using indepen-
dent randomness).
2. Each player (locally) adds all n shares received in step 1.
Lemma 3. In any given context where s and t are shared, the above protocol results in the product st being shared,
and nothing else. More precisely, the new information obtained by any ignorant set is independent of any information
held (by this set) prior to the execution of the protocol.
Proof. The correctness of the new sharing of st follows from (2). According to Lemma 2, for any ignorant set, every
sharing (by some player) of a value results in independent information. Hence this is true for the entire protocol. 
9 Such a partition exists because of condition (1). Some of the Um may be empty.
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5.4. Comparison with the Beaver–Wool scheme
The secret-sharing scheme of [2] works as follows: The secret is split by a sum sharing into l shares, where l =|| is
the number of minimal qualiﬁed sets. Then each share is given to the players in one of the minimal qualiﬁed sets.While
this sharing looks similar to ours (in our scheme we consider the maximal non-qualiﬁed sets rather than the minimal
qualiﬁed sets) it differs in a crucial way: condition (1) is required not only for the multiplication protocol, but even for
the mere reconstruction of shared secrets. A qualiﬁed set can reconstruct the secret because it overlaps with any other
minimal qualiﬁed set and hence knows all the shares, i.e., one must start with an access structure (and corresponding
secrecy structure) which satisﬁes (1) in the ﬁrst place. This is the reason why the scheme of [2] cannot be enhanced to
tolerate active corruption.
6. Secure MPC for a general (,)-adversary
The basic structure of the protocol is as described in Section 5.1. Two changes are required to tolerate also active
corruption: The secret-sharing scheme and the multiplication protocol must be made robust against cheating by a set
of players in  (including possibly the dealer in case of the secret-sharing scheme). These two protocols are described
in the following two subsections.
6.1. Veriﬁable secret sharing
As mentioned above, a secret-sharing scheme is useless if not all players can be assumed to behave correctly. A
ﬁrst problem is that some players may contribute false shares during reconstruction. This can be solved by distributing
the secret in a redundant manner, allowing for error correction. Since this requires the set of shares to satisfy a
certain consistency condition, a second problem arises, namely that a cheating dealer can distribute inconsistent shares.
Veriﬁable secret-sharing solves both these problems.
Deﬁnition 3. A veriﬁable secret-sharing (VSS) scheme for a set P of players with secrecy structure  and secure for
adversary structure  consists of two protocols, Share and Reconstruct, such that even if the adversary corrupts players
according to , the following conditions hold:
1. If Share terminates successfully, then theReconstruct protocol yields the same ﬁxed value for all possible adversary
strategies, i.e., the dealer (even if corrupted) is committed to a single value.
2. If the dealer is honest during Share, then Reconstruct always yields his input value.
3. If the dealer is honest, then the information obtained by any ignorant set in  after the sharing phase is independent
of any information held (by this set) prior to the execution of the protocol. The information obtained in the
reconstruction phase is nothing beyond the reconstructed value. More precisely, given the reconstructed value, the
information obtained by any ignorant set in the reconstruction phase is independent of any information held (by
this set) prior to the execution of the protocol.
We show how the secret-sharing scheme of Section 5.2 for the secrecy structure  can be extended to aVSS scheme
secure in presence of a (,)-adversary, provided that  and  satisfy the following condition:
P /∈ unionsq  unionsq . (3)
We ﬁrst describe the VSS sharing protocol, which only depends on  but not on , and then discuss condition (3)
together with the reconstruction protocol.
To assure that the dealer correctly shares a value, we only need to guarantee, independently for each of the k shares,
that all honest players receiving this share obtain the same value.10 This is easily achieved as follows. For each share,
say si , all players receiving that share (those in Ti) check pairwise whether the value received from the dealer is the
10 Guaranteeing this condition independently for each of the k shares sufﬁces because the k shares are completely general and need not satisfy
a consistency condition like in schemes based on polynomials. Every set of k shares uniquely determines a secret.
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same. If any inconsistency is detected, the players detecting it complain using broadcast, and the dealer must broadcast
si to all the players. Secrecy cannot be violated because a complaint is sent only if either the dealer is corrupted or a
corrupted player received si , hence the adversary knew si already. After these checks it is guaranteed that all honest
players knowing si hold the same value for si .
VSS Share ():
1. Share the secret s using the scheme of Section 5.2.11
2. For each share si : Each pair of players in P \Ti check (over a secure channel) whether their received values for
si agree.
If any inconsistency is detected, the players complain, using (possibly simulated) broadcast.
3. The dealer broadcasts all shares for which complaints were raised, and the players accept these shares.
If the dealer refuses any of these broadcasts,the protocol is aborted.
Condition (3) implies that for a given collection of values received during reconstruction of a share,say si ,there is
only one consistent explanation for which is the correct value of si ,namely that value v for which the set of differing
values corresponds to a set in . For a given list of (partially false) values for si ,if there were two possible values v′ and
v′′ with corresponding sets A′ and A′′ in ,then the set P \(A′ ∪ A′′) alone could not be qualiﬁed in the secret-sharing
scheme,since otherwise the secret would be uniquely determined by those values,contradicting the assumption. But if
P \(A′ ∪ A′′) is not qualiﬁed,it is in ,and this contradicts condition (3). Hence the following protocol works.
VSS Reconstruct (,):
1. All players send all their shares (bilaterally) to all other players.12
2. Each player reconstructs (locally) each of the k shares s1, . . . , sk and adds them up to obtain the secret
s = s1 + · · · + sk .
Reconstruction of share si (same for each player): Let vj forj ∈ Ti be the value (for si) sent by player pj . Take
the (unique) value v such that there exists A ∈  with vj = v for all j ∈ Ti − A.
Note that the reconstruction is performed independently for each share si . This fact is used in the robust multiplication
protocol discussed below.
The proof of the following lemma follows from the above discussion.
Lemma 4. The above sharing and reconstruction protocols form aVSS protocol for secrecy structure and adversary
structure , if P /∈ unionsq  unionsq .
Two shared values can be added by each player adding the corresponding shares. More generally we have:
Lemma 5. Linear functions of values shared according to the VSS scheme can be computed by each player computing
the linear function on the corresponding shares.
Proof. Since the secret sharing scheme is linear, the resulting sharing is a correct sharing of the linear function of the
shared values. Since the same consistency guarantees hold as after the VSS sharing phase, the reconstruction protocol
also works. Secrecy cannot be violated in this protocol since it involves no communication. 
6.2. Robust multiplication protocol
The approach of Section 5.3 fails if active cheating occurs because a single false term si tj can change the result
arbitrarily. Hence we need a method for guaranteeing that a player correctly computes and shares such a term. This is
achieved by assigning each term si tj to all players knowing both si and tj , and having each of these players share the
value by VSS. After each of these (say r) players has shared si tj , the players open r − 1 differences of these values to
verify that they are all equal to 0. This does not violate secrecy because if no cheater is involved, no information will be
11 If a player does not receive a share because the dealer is corrupted, then he can take a default share, say 0.
12 No broadcast is required.
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leaked. On the other hand, if at least one cheater is involved, secrecy need not be guaranteed since the adversary knew
si and ti beforehand. If any of the differences is not 0, then si and tj are reconstructed and si tj is computed openly and
shared with a default sharing. Correctness is guaranteed as long as one of the involved players is honest since successful
cheating requires to pass the checking phase without any complaints. This is guaranteed if the condition
P /∈ unionsq  unionsq  (4)
is satisﬁed because each term si tj is known to the players in the complement of a set in  unionsq . This condition is also
necessary. In summary, we have:
Multiplication protocol:
Precondition: Two values s =∑ki=1 si and t =∑ki=1 ti are shared by VSS.
Postcondition: st is shared by VSS.
1. Each player pm computes all terms si tj he can (i.e. those for which m ∈ Ti ∩ Tj ) and shares them using VSS.
2. For each (i, j), let (pm1 , . . . , pmr ) be the ordered list of the players who computed si tj in step 1 (where r
depends on i and j).
The players (collectively) compute13 and open the r − 1 diﬀerences of the value shared by pm1 and the value
shared by pmi ,for i = 2, . . . , r .
3. If all these opened values are 0, then the sharing by pm1 is used as the sharing of si tj .
Otherwise, si and tj are reconstructed and the k-out-of-k sharing for the term si tj is deﬁned (arbitrarily) as the
list (si tj , 0, . . . , 0) of shares.
4. The players (locally) compute the sum of their shares of all terms si tj , resulting in a sharing of st.
The proof of the following lemma follows from the above discussion.
Lemma 6. The above protocol is a secure multiplication protocol for secrecy structure  and adversary structure ,
if P /∈ unionsq  unionsq .
7. Conclusions
Because of the simplicity of the presented protocols, it is easy to verify that their complexity is polynomial in n, ||,
and ||. Although for a threshold adversary the complexity is exponential in n, for a very small number of players the
protocol is very efﬁcient and can possibly lead to the preferred protocol from a practical viewpoint.
One advantage of the described protocol is that it works over any ﬁeld or ring, in particular also over the binary ﬁeld
GF(2). This is signiﬁcant in view of the fact that a digital circuit can easily, and without essential loss of efﬁciency,
be transformed into a circuit using only XOR andAND gates, hence into an arithmetic circuit over GF(2). In contrast,
other protocols require a ﬁeld GF(q) of size q >n, resulting possibly in a complexity overhead for translating the
digital circuit into an arithmetic circuit over GF(q).
A theme of general interest in secure MPC is to design protocols that are efﬁcient in the size of the descriptions of
the secrecy and the adversary structures (or, more generally, the adversary speciﬁcation). Obviously, this task depends
on which type of description one uses, i.e., on the adversary speciﬁcation language. The speciﬁcation language of this
paper is the list of all maximal sets of a structure. Assuming = , a protocol that is efﬁcient for a substantially more
powerful speciﬁcation language was given in [8]:  can be described by any linear secret-sharing scheme with secrecy
structure . It is an open problem to ﬁnd other speciﬁcation languages for which efﬁcient protocols exist.
13 Computing the difference is achieved by each player computing the difference locally.
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